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Sammendrag 
Vi undersøker i hvilken grad en nedbygging av den globale kullbaserte kraftproduksjonen vil 
stimulere etterspørselen etter naturgass fram til 2050, og dermed også gassproduksjonen i arktiske 
områder. Arktis er fremfor alt rik på naturgass da denne utgjør om lag 70 prosent av de uoppdagede 
petroleumsressursene i regionen. 
 
Vi bruker en rekursiv, dynamisk partiell likevektsmodell for de globale energimarkedene. Vårt 
referansescenario tar utgangspunkt i New Policy Scenario i IEAʼs World Energy Outlook fra 2015. I 
dette scenariet vil fornybar energi øke sitt bidrag til global elektrisitetsforsyning, mens kull sin andel 
vil avta. Vår politikkanalyse ser på en videre utfasing av kull og en videre innfasing av fornybar energi 
i tråd med 2 graders målet for den globale kraftsektoren slik World Energy Outlook skisserer. Vi 
analyserer så konsekvensene for den framtidige gassproduksjonen i fem arktiske regioner: Alaska, 
arktisk Canada, Grønland, arktisk Russland og arktisk Norge.  
 
Den sterke trenden mot ikke-fossil kraftproduksjon i politikkscenariet for 2-gradersmålet, fremfor alt 
etter 2030, fører til en lavere markedsandel for naturgass i den globale kraftforsyningen fram mot 
2050, selv om den totale elektrisitetsproduksjonen dobles over hele perioden. Men selv om det blir 
mindre behov for gass, så er det først og fremst kull som blir rammet. 
 
Dette innebærer også redusert arktisk gassproduksjon i forhold til referansebanen. For Arktis som 
helhet er nedgangen i samlet produksjon fram til 2050 på rundt 9 prosent, mens Grønland og Alaska 
opplever en sterk nedgang på hhv. 69 og 31 prosent, Årsaken er at størstedelen av deres framtidige 
gassproduksjon kommer etter 2030, og det er først og fremst i denne perioden at fornybar energi 
begynner å fortrenge gass (og kull). Reduksjonen i samlet produksjon i arktisk Russland av å fase ut 
kull og fase inn fornybar energi er så lav som 6 prosent, mens reduksjonen for arktisk Norge er på 13 
prosent. Årsaken er at arktisk Russland og til dels arktisk Norge har en relativ større andel av sin 
produksjon i årene før 2030 enn de andre regionene, altså før fornybar energi begynner å fortrenge 
gass i kraftsektoren i særlig stor grad.  
 
Resultatene viser at selv i en situasjon med mindre ressurser og høyere kostnader for gass i arktiske 
områder, er produksjonen i 2050 ikke mye lavere enn i dag i vårt politikkscenario. Dette viser at på 
tross av dårligere utsikter for regionen i scenariet med utfasing av kull og innfasing av fornybar energi, 
vil det fortsatt være lønnsomt med investeringer i og utbygging av gassfelt, gitt våre forutsetninger. 
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1. Introduction 
Coal has been running the wheels and warming the homes for centuries. Unfortunately it has also 
warmed the globe and changed its climate (IPCC, 2013). When mitigating climate change, coal stands 
out as a major target due to its high emissions of CO2 per unit thermal energy. Coal also generates 
high emissions of health damaging air pollution and causes tragic mine and traffic accidents 
(Sovacool, 2008).  
 
Coal and gas are close substitutes in power generation, hence, the future role of gas is closely linked to 
the future role of coal.  Both fuels are subject to climate policy, but gas has the advantage of being less 
GHG emission intensive and less of a burden on local air pollution and health. In a green transition gas 
is regarded as a low carbon alternative. This study investigates how a low carbon policy will affect the 
gas market and in particular the supply from arctic regions, where the cost of extraction is relatively 
high for many fields compared to more temperate regions. 
 
Coal covers almost 30 per cent of global primary energy demand and plays a particularly important 
role in electricity production. In 2012 coal generated 41 per cent of global electricity, however, its 
share is falling. Gas is the only fossil feedstock that is on the rise (IEA, 2014a). 
 
In 2012 coal use was the source of 44 per cent of global CO2 emissions (IEA, 2014a). According to the 
Global Carbon Budget (2016) the world must limit accumulated future emissions to 860 GtCO2 to 
ensure, with 66 per cent probability, that the global mean temperature increase stays within 2 degrees 
Celsius. If the 2013 emission level of CO2 from energy use persists, the carbon budget will be 
consumed within 24 years. With a 1.5 degrees ambition there is hardly room for future use of fossil 
energy (Oil Change International, 2016). Hence, some argue that also gas resources have to be left in 
the ground and that it is least costly to leave high cost resources unused (McGlade and Etkins, 2015 
and Oil Change International, 2016).  
 
A decade of new climate research culminating in the IPCC 5th assessment report has changed the sense 
of urgency and lifted the issue of climate mitigation to a higher political level, as demonstrated at the 
COP21 meeting in Paris where a new climate agreement was made based on pledges from 196 nations 
in December 2015. It adds to the urgency that carbon capture and storage (CCS) has turned out less 
promising for the next decades than earlier expected. IEA (2014a) expects CCS to start being deployed 
from around 2020, but only 3 per cent of coal fired power plants are expected to be equipped with 
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CCS by 2040. Coal with CCS will raise the cost of electricity by 40-75 per cent (IEA, 2014a). 
However, emissions reductions become more feasible as the costs of solar and wind power have been 
falling rapidly over the last few years (IEA, 2016). The coal future seems bleak considering that coal 
power is also facing strict and costly regulation of air pollutants in major coal burning countries. 
 
USA and China are the two largest economies and the two largest coal users in the world. Well in 
advance of the Paris meeting both countries had explicit policies in place to reduce both CO2 
emissions and local air pollution. At a summit meeting in 2014 President Barack Obama and President 
Xi Jinping gave statements pledging to reduce CO2 emissions substantially towards 2030. Obama 
pledged a 26-28 per cent reduction from the 2005 emission level, whereas Xi promised to cap CO2 
emissions by 2030 at the latest. Behind these pledges lie ambitious domestic plans for emission 
reductions from coal based electricity. 
 
In August 2015 the Obama administration implemented the Clean Power Plan, estimated to reduce 
CO2 emissions to 32 per cent below 2005 level by 2030 (EPA, 2015a).  The plan introduces a cap on 
CO2 emission intensity in power production at state level. The electricity consumption in USA is 
expected to grow marginally with only 0.1 per cent per year on average towards 2040 (IEA, 2015). 
During 2016 the gas share of power production is expected for the first time to surpass the share of 
coal power (EIA, 2016). The move towards low carbon energy is further supported by the Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards (EPA, 2015b), which particularly increase the costs of coal based electricity. 
Switching from coal to gas power is convenient as it creates a market for domestic shale gas and has 
substantial advantages regarding health damage.  
 
Total benefits of the Clean Power Plan are estimated to be in the range of USD 55 billion to USD 93 
billion per year in 2030 (EPA, 2016), far above the costs. Health benefits through reductions in 
particle emissions and other local pollutants are estimated to yield 60 per cent of the plan’s gross 
benefits (Fowlie et al., 2014).  President Donald Trump signals a supporting attitude to the coal 
industry. However, even if the Clean Power Plan and the Mercury and Toxic Standards were removed 
under Trump, the risks of facing future returns of high cost regulations after his presidency might 
discourage investments in new capacity. 
 
In China there is a strong political pressure on the government to improve local air quality. To control 
the smog problem, the State Council required the emissions from all coal-fired power plants to comply 
with emissions standards for gas turbines by 2020 (State Council, 2015), with hastened deadlines for 
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existing plants in the Eastern region by 2017 and  the Central region by 2018. Already in January 2015 
the government announced a cap on investments in new coal-fired power plants in the Eastern 
provinces (National Energy Bureau, 2015) and a five year moratorium on new coal-fired plants in the 
coal rich province of Shanxi (Shanxi Provincial Government, 2015). The logical consequence of these 
regulations would be a phase out of coal for power production and a switch to gas powered and 
renewable energy sources. Details on implementation will be decided on in the further elaboration of 
the 13th Four Year Plan 2016-2020.  
 
Hence, the two largest coal users and emitters of CO2 have both clean air and low carbon policies in 
the pipeline and the Paris agreement left a clear message that most other countries will make efforts to 
reduce emissions, not least the EU pledging to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 per cent by 2030. 
  
These events make prospects of stranded assets in coal mining and coal fired power production 
emerge as a real risk to private and public investors (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014). A Citigroup 
analysis warns that the 2 degree target might involve stranded assets of USD 100 trillion by 2050 
(Citigroup, 2015). The risk of stranded assets has also started to worry central banks. In 2015 the Bank 
of England Governor Mark Carney warned investors that “the vast majority of reserves are 
unburnable” if the 2 degrees target shall be reached (The Guardian, 2015a). Hence, for climate reasons 
we might face a situation similar to a sharp decline in reserves. The significance of reserves in 
company value was illustrated for oil when Shell restated its reserves in 2004. The 20 per cent 
reduction of oil reserves led to a 10 per cent reduction in the share price and a £3 billion in company 
value over night (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011).   
 
Further, there is a trend towards low or no carbon finance among large private investors. There is a 
fast growing interest in Green Bonds, issued with a label to finance sustainable investments, largely in 
renewable energy, environmental friendly infrastructure and energy efficiency (Climate Bonds 
Initiative, 2016). A trend among investors to divest in coal and keep coal out of their future portfolios 
has also taken off during the last few years. In the wake of the UN Climate Summit in New York 2014 
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund pledged to keep coal and tar sand out of their endowments. Further 
breakthrough occurred when the Norwegian Parliament decided to divest the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global with USD 900bn in coal by 2020 at the latest (The Guardian, 2015b) and the 
French global insurance company AXA with assets of € 1200bn pledged to divest in coal (Bloomberg, 
2015). Bank of America Merrill Lynch was the first large bank to divest in coal in early 2015, 
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followed by Citigroupʼs pledge to stop coal mining in general in addition to their earlier decision to 
quit lending to mountain top removal mining (Financial Times, 2015).     
 
As demonstrated already by the swift transition from coal to gas in US after the phase in of shale gas, 
transitions can be rapid and change the energy pattern of regions substantially when alternatives are 
available. These shifts in energy patterns might also have marked regional implications, and one of 
these is the potential impacts on the role of the Arctic in global gas supply. 
 
This study looks at how a greener power market might affect the future gas market, with focus on the 
arctic supply. The Arctic is above all rich on natural gas as 70 per cent of undiscovered petroleum 
resources in the region are gas. With around one fourth of global undiscovered gas resources, the 
Arctic has attracted attention as a last large frontier of gas outside the Middle East and North African 
regions (MENA). However, gas production in some arctic regions is facing harsh weather conditions, 
high costs and long lead times, at least when production moves to more remote offshore areas. Further, 
there will be continued competition with US lower 48 and other regional production as shale gas is 
increasing, in addition to huge conventional gas reserves in the Middle East coming on stream, above 
all in Iran and Qatar.  
 
For the present study we first develop an updated reference scenario based on the New Policy Scenario 
(NPS) of IEA (2014a) and identify the path of future arctic gas supply to 2050. Second, we assess the 
effects of gradually phasing out coal and phasing in renewables for electricity production in broad 
outline with the 2 degree scenario for the power sector of IEA (2014a). However, in our policy 
scenario coal is not totally phased out prior to 2050, while renewables are on the rise.  
  
In an earlier study of arctic petroleum extraction towards 2050 (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2012), the 
future coal scenarios were largely based on expectations in the late 2000s, as e.g. IEA (2008). Total 
coal demand already in 2020 is now expected to be around 20 per cent lower than was predicted in the 
latter publication. 
 
This paper analyzes the competition between coal, renewables and natural gas for electricity 
production under a more stringent policy towards coal. The particular strength of our approach is that 
supply of natural gas is modeled with plausible costs and reserves estimates, enabling an assessment of 
the economic potential for gas supply from the Arctic. Gas and coal represent David versus Goliat 
among the fossil fuels in a transition to low-carbon electricity. Given the long term perspective 
8 
underlying investments in petroleum, the study provides useful insights into the economic potential of 
the two in light of climate policy. 
 
Various studies have looked at consequences of various climate policies on the mix in energy demand 
at a regional scale. E.g. von Hirschlausen (2017) applies various models to analyze effects on natural 
gas production in Europe and its neighboring regions of the development to a lower-carbon Europe. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze how the competition between gas, coal and 
renewables in the power sector on a global scale can affect the regional gas production in the Arctic. 
 
This paper is organized in the following way: In Section 2 we describe the FRISBEE model of the 
global energy markets. Section 3 describes the scenarios, while Section 4 concludes. 
2. The global energy model FRISBEE 
FRISBEE is a recursive, dynamic partial equilibrium model for the global energy markets, previously 
used for studies of arctic petroleum production (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2012), emission from 
shipping and petroleum activities in the Arctic (Peters et al., 2011), impacts of petroleum industry 
restructuring (Aune et al., 2010) and globalization of natural gas markets and trade (Aune et al., 2009).  
 
The start-year is 2012 and the recursive model is solved sequentially year by year. The model covers 
coal, oil and gas, and further, electricity generation based on either of the fossil fuels and non-fossil 
feedstock, assisted by a transformation sector. For each energy good demand equals supply, with 
manufacturing and households/services combined as two final end-users. The end-user prices are the 
sum of producer price, transport, distribution and marketing costs, VAT and a carbon tax, and are 
mainly taken from IEA (2012a), IEA (2012b) and GIZ (2013). Demand from the final end-users is 
log-linear functions of prices, population, GDP per capita and autonomous energy efficiency 
improvements (AEEI). The per capita income elasticities vary a lot, from negative elasticities for coal 
in Western Europe to somewhat below one for natural gas in several other regions. The long-run direct 
price elasticity varies between -0.1 and -0.6 with a weighted average of -0.30 for households and -0.21 
for industries for all energy goods. The cross-price elasticities are low, however, substitution 
possibilities are markedly higher in the power sector than in manufacturing and households/services. 
The elasticities are mainly taken from Liu (2004), IEA (2007), Tsirimokos (2011) and Burke and 
Yang (2016).  
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FRISBEE has an elaborate modelling of (oil and) the regional gas markets, while the worldwide 
markets for coal, electricity and renewables are modelled with less detail. In FRISBEE fossil fuels are 
traded between regions, whereas electricity is only traded within each region. Coal (and oil) trade 
takes place via a common pool, whereas gas trade takes place bilaterally between 16 regions due to 
larger transport costs. The gas and coal markets are assumed to be competitive. FRISBEE depicts the 
gas market both as global and integrated, as liberalization is taking place both in OECD and non-
OECD regions, gradually reducing the gas market power of large, downstream companies. North 
America and the UK have liberalized their markets and trends towards liberalization also characterize 
other OECD countries (such as countries in the EU and Japan) and some non-OECD countries also 
(Aune et al., 2009). 
 
The extent of spot trade is growing fast, and gas price indexation is partially replacing the oil price 
link in long-term contracts. A major factor behind this development is the decline in costs of 
transportation of LNG (Barnes and Bosworth, 2015). Thus, within the gas markets we have perfect 
competition both upstream and downstream, and the gas price is determined endogenously in regional 
markets.  
 
The potential for arbitrage from price differences between two regions is never larger than the 
transportation cost. LNG and pipeline costs are from IEA (2009) and Songburst (2014), and unit costs 
are assumed to be constant in this analysis. Both capital and operating costs are included in the cost 
figures, except for pipeline capacities before 2022 (where only operating costs matter). Total 
transportation costs are linear functions of the distance between two regions. There is no restriction on 
investments in transport capacity between regions as long as it is profitable. New transport 
infrastructure can be both LNG and pipeline. Each year the cheapest transport technology between 
pair of regions is chosen for given capacity investments. Thus, a region may import both via LNG and 
pipeline transport, but not from the same region. However, changes in transport costs over time might 
imply changing transportation methods. 
 
FRISBEE provides elaborate modelling of investments and production1, accounting explicitly for 
discoveries, reserves, field development and production of gas. Gas production generally takes place 
in 16 regions and 4 field categories depending on location onshore/offshore, depth of offshore fields 
and size of resources (see Appendix A). We focus on six arctic regions: Alaska, Arctic Canada, Arctic 
                                                     
1 For this modelling work we have benefited from access to the comprehensive IHS Energy field database, see  
www.ihs.com. 
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Norway, Greenland, East Arctic Russia and West Arctic Russia. The East Arctic Russian region 
covers the petroleum provinces from the Sakha region and eastwards, i.e. from the Laptev Sea to the 
Russian part of the Chukchi Sea. We do not distinguish between single fields within the field 
categories. 
 
We assume perfect competition and endogenous prices in the 16 regional gas markets. For gas 
FRISBEE distinguishes between three field stages within each field category, i.e. fields in production, 
undeveloped fields and undiscovered fields. Supply from developed fields in the model is determined 
so that marginal operating costs equal producer prices net of gross taxes. Operating costs are 
increasing functions of production, but are generally low unless production is close to the fields’ 
production capacity; then they increase rapidly. The cost functions are calibrated based on data on 
production costs in different locations.  
 
Gas companies may invest in new fields and in reserve extensions of developed fields. 
Investments decisions are driven by expected net present values (NPV), which are calculated for each 
field category in each region. Expected NPV depends on expected price (the average over last six 
years), a pre-specified required rate of return (10 per cent in real terms), unit operating and capital 
costs, and net and gross tax rates. Unit capital costs are convex in the short term, and increase when 
the pool of undeveloped reserves available for new fields declines and when the recovery rate rises in 
the case of reserve extension. Investments first target the most profitable areas and gradually shift to 
more remote and costly areas, leading to a geographically spread of the global gas production. 
 
New gas discoveries are modelled in a simpler way than investments in already discovered fields. The 
amount of discoveries generally depends on expected prices and the amount of undiscovered resources 
in each region. It is based on data from USGS (2000), with a partly update in USGS (2012). The 
undiscovered gas resources for the arctic provinces are from the special regional study reported in 
USGS (2008). The expected unconventional shale gas resources are updated with data from EIA 
(2013). 
 
For arctic regions the time lag from investment decision to maximum plateau production is generally 
50-100 per cent longer than in comparable fields within the non-arctic regions of the corresponding 
arctic state (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2012). The operational and capital costs are based on the IHS 
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database.2 Investment costs in arctic and non-arctic regions are assumed to increase over time as the 
reserves are depleted. However, additional discoveries and technological progress reduce the cost of 
developing new fields. In addition, costs will increase as arctic production moves from onshore to 
offshore areas, which also often contain smaller fields (USGS, 2008). 
 
The global gas industry allocates up to 50 per cent of the annual cash flow to field investments. The 
cash flow constraint is generally not binding in our scenarios, i.e. the gas companies invest in all 
projects that give at least the required rate of return of 10 per cent.3  
 
We also assume perfect competition and endogenous prices in the 16 regional coal markets. Regional 
coal prices are world coal market price plus region specific transportation costs. For coal we apply 
more simple cost functions than for gas as we do not distinguish between the investment and the 
production phase. Costs are increasing in accumulated supply, while technological progress leads to 
lower cost. Regional supply is determined so that marginal operating costs equal producer prices 
(production capacities are not explicitly modelled). The cost functions are calibrated based on data on 
production costs in different locations. Costs are based on information based on IEA (2014a) and IEA 
(2015). 
 
Regional electricity production is a function of the electricity price, prices of energy inputs, carbon 
taxes, fuel efficiency (conversion rates) and generation costs. The regional volume of supply of 
renewables and nuclear is exogenous. We emphasize, as explained above, that the endogenous 
variables in our model are the regional supply, demand and prices of gas, coal and electricity. 
3. Scenarios 
This section compares a policy scenario reflecting phase out of coal and phase in of renewables for 
power production with a reference scenario. Further, we develop various sensitivity scenarios to check 
the robustness of our results. 
                                                     
2 The initial regional costs from IHS have been updated with data on break-even prices from Rystad Energy, see 
http://www.rystadenergy.com/. 
3 For a more extensive presentation of the FRISBEE model, see Aune et al. (2005). Aune et al. focus on the oil market, but 
natural gas supply is modelled quite similarly as oil supply, so most of the model description carries over. 
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3.1. Reference scenario 
Our reference scenario follows the IEA (2014a) New Policy Scenario (NPS) taking into account 
energy and climate oriented policy measures as determined by mid-2014. In addition, two major 
policy proposals were included in NPS although specific measures to implement them were not yet in 
place at that time. One is the US EPA Clean Power Plan (CPP, 2015) expected to reduce CO2 
emissions by 30 per cent in 2030 compared with the level in 2005 (18 per cent reduction from the 
level in 2016). The other is the EU climate and energy policy framework with a 40 per cent reduction 
in CO2 emissions compared with 1990 level by 2030 as a step to reduce emissions by 80 per cent or 
more by 2050. On the other hand, China´s 13th Five Year Plan target of capping energy use by 2020 
and a reduction in CO2 intensity by 18 per cent were not included. For Japan, the NPS assumes that the 
majority of the nuclear reactors will be restarted. 
 
GDP and population are exogenous in the model. Population growth rate is based on United Nations 
(2015), while the annual GDP growth rates per capita in real terms are based on IMF (2012) until 2017 
and the World Bank (2012) from 2018 until 2030. After 2030 we assume unchanged GDP per capita 
growth rate in the US (0.6 per cent p.a.), and that other countries gradually approach the US GDP per 
capita level by 2100.  The AEEI-indices for energy intensity are calibrated so that demand for 
electricity and other energy goods in the two end-user sectors in the various regions in 2040 are 
broadly in line with the projections in NPS. We impose carbon taxes in the power sector such that 
regional electricity production in 2040 by source aligns with the NPS.4 We let the yearly average 
linear growth in electricity demand in each region in the period 2015-2040 continue the subsequent 
decade. 
 
The regional volume of supply of renewables and nuclear into the power sector is exogenous, based on 
the pathways of the NPS. Table 1 shows that currently oil contributes only 4 per cent to electricity 
production globally and is gradually phased out as an energy source for power production.  The 
exogenous share of renewable and nuclear electricity in total supply increases from 35 per cent in 
2015, to 42 per cent in 20405 and further to 45 per cent in 2050.  Hence, as much as 55 per cent of 
global electricity is still based on coal and gas towards the end of our projection period in the reference 
scenario. 
 
                                                     
4 The regional CO2-prices vary from 20 USD to 50 USD per ton in 2040 and 2050 (2012-prices). 
5 The share of nuclear power of total electricity supply is 12 per cent in 2040 in NPS. 
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Electricity supply almost doubles over the period,6 while the use of non-fossil feedstock in the power 
sector increases by as much as 240 per cent. Coal-based supply of power increases towards 2030, 
when demand levels off. However, coal still has a share in electricity production of 28 per cent in 
2050. The level of gas demand from the global power sector more than doubles and reaches a share of 
26 per cent in 2050.7 
 
Table 1. World electricity production by source. Reference Scenario 
 2015 2015 2040 2040 2050 2050 
 Mtoe Share in 
per cent 
Mtoe Share in 
per cent 
Mtoe Share in 
per cent 
Total electricity production  2 092 100 3 471 100 3 891 100 
Natural gas   490 23 944 27 1 030 26 
Coal  795 38 1 059 30 1 055 28 
Oil  92 4 28 1 25 1 
Renewables and nuclear  715 35 1 440 42 1 781 45 
 
We assume a natural gas resource situation in the Arctic as depicted by USGS (2008) and that the gas 
companies have full access to all reserves. Total gas resources consist of proven reserves (developed 
and undeveloped) defined as fully identified and economically viable reserves, whereas undiscovered 
resources are identified through geological surveys. Undiscovered resources are found and may be 
developed if they are profitable. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total undiscovered gas resources among arctic regions. Arctic 
Russia dominates with about 70 per cent of total arctic undiscovered gas resources, whereas Alaska is 
second with 14 per cent, almost as much natural gas as in Greenland, Northern Canada and Northern 
Norway together. Greenland has larger gas resources than Arctic Canada and Arctic Norway 
combined. For the Arctic as a whole, about 80 per cent of the undiscovered gas resources are found in 
offshore areas, however, Arctic Russia stands out with almost as much as 90 per cent offshore.  
 
                                                     
6 India and China experience the highest growth in electricity production over the projection period, with 340 per cent and 
225 per cent, respectively. The lowest growth is found for Western Europe and the US, with around 120 per cent and 130 per 
cent, respectively. Still, Western Europe and the US combined have a share of 22 per cent of the global power supply in 
2050, while India and China taken together has 35 per cent. 
7 The share of gas in electricity supply in 2050 in the US and Western Europe is 34 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively. 
The share in India is 12 per cent, while China has the lowest share of 7 per cent. This means that the volume of gas as an 
input to the power sector is twice as high in the US and Western Europe taken together compared to India and China 
combined. 
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The global average gas price in our reference scenario increases by around 35 per cent from 2012 to 
2040 and a further 10 per cent to 2050, when it reaches almost 520 MUSD/Mtoe (2012-prices). The 
future prices still differ somewhat across regions, albeit less than today. 
 
Figure 2 shows arctic gas production in the reference scenario. Arctic supply of gas will slightly 
decline from 500 Mtoe in 2012 to about 450 Mtoe by the early 2020s, when the supply starts to 
increase.8 The increase in total arctic gas production is primarily due to higher Russian volumes, but 
also partly a result of increases in gas supply from the other arctic regions, although from generally 
low levels. The development in supply in the reference scenario from the West Arctic regions is 
shown in more detail in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 1.  Regional distribution of arctic undiscovered gas resources 
 
Source: USGS (2008) and EIA (2013). 
 
In the reference scenario the global share of coal for electricity production is reduced from 38 to 28 
per cent by 2050 (see Table 1). Global electricity production is driving a marked increase in arctic gas 
supply from around 2030, even though the exogenous share of non-fossil feedstock is increasing from 
                                                     
8 The gas volume in 2050 is almost 50 per cent higher than in Lindholt and Glomsrød (2012), which based their future coal 
scenarios on expectations in the late 2000s, as e.g. IEA (2008). Since then there has been a change in expectations towards 
less coal and more gas fired power plants (in the NPS).  
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35 per cent in 2015 to 45 per cent in 2050. In the reference scenario the amount of arctic gas supply 
increases by around 70 per cent during the period 2030-2050.  
 
Arctic Russia is a giant gas producer in arctic and global context, with 95 per cent of total Arctic 
production today and almost 90 per cent of total Russian supply. Arctic Russian production increases 
by 33 per cent towards 2050 and the lionʼs share of this increase beyond 2030 has to come from 
resources that are not yet discovered and to a large extent in offshore areas. One might question if this 
is realistic as so far there is no gas production in Russian Arctic waters. Currently the only offshore 
gas production is taking place in more temperate regions near the island of Sakhalin. Russian 
engineers are world leaders in inland arctic pipeline technology as demonstrated in the Yamal 
Peninsula (Stern, 2009), where almost all Arctic Russian production takes place. The supergiant 
Bovanenko onshore gas field began production in 2012. Bovanenko is even larger than the huge 
offshore Stockman gas field, which is put on hold, and total supply from Bovanenko is expected to be 
almost 20 per cent of total Russian gas supply as from 2020 (Gazprom, 2016). However, for Russian 
arctic gas production to move offshore, the industry might need technological transfers from more 
experienced foreign partners, e.g. in deep sea operations.  
 
Figure 2.    Arctic gas production. Reference Scenario. Mtoe 
 
 
Although there will be a relatively constant future demand for Russian gas in Europe, there will be a 
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Chayanovskoye and Kovyktinskoye in the Republic of Sakha to Vladivostok with further access to 
China and East-Asia. Power of Siberia is expected to transport gas soon after 2019 (IEA, 2014b).  
 
There are plans for connecting this pipeline to the rest of the Russian pipeline system, so that 
eventually gas from Yamal in Western Siberia can be transported to the Asian markets. In addition, the 
Yamal LNG plant, which is under construction, will start production in 2017 for export to Asia along 
the Northern Sea Route and to Europe (Total, 2016). Hence, although there will be a relatively 
constant future demand for Russian gas in Europe, the model predicts an increase in Asian demand, 
leading to increased Russian output of gas after 2025. 
 
Although Alaska has 14 per cent of the undiscovered gas in the Arctic, resources will only gradually 
be developed the first years and only really take off from around 2035. Such an increase is probably 
conditioned by an 800 miles gas pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the southern parts of Alaska, similar to 
the existing North Slope oil pipeline. There are plans of other pipelines and LNG factories, e.g. a new 
LNG plant in southern Alaska besides that the plant at Cook Inlet might come on stream (EIA, 2017). 
Shell and Statoil withdrew from exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea in 2015 for commercial 
reasons, and this raised the question if the Alaskan increase in gas supply is realistic. However, almost 
as much as 90 per cent of the Alaskan undiscovered gas could be found onshore on the North Slope or 
offshore in adjacent areas closer to land than more remote fields far out in the Chukchi Sea. Hence, 
Alaska might harvest considerable amounts of gas without having to battle offshore in a harsh 
environment.  
 
Figure 3.   Regional distribution of West Arctic gas production. Reference Scenario.  Mtoe 
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Canada starts out with a rapid growth from low levels in the reference scenario, matching the 
production level of Alaska around 2030, when Canadian production enters a path of somewhat slower 
growth reaching a plateau of 50 Mtoe in 2050.  A rapid initial development of Canada's gas reserves is 
likely to depend on the development of LNG plants and/or the much talked about (and delayed) 
Mackenzie pipeline supposed to transport gas from the North West Territories and south to Alberta 
and further. According to Transcanada (2017) natural gas market conditions do not signal a 
commercially viable opportunity for this pipeline today, but project activities may be restarted at some 
future date. In addition, indigenous rights have postponed the project several times. Further, Canada's 
indigenous stopped seismic surveys in Baffin Bay near Greenland as they had not been consulted on 
the issue, and thus not complied with their legal rights.    
 
Today Norway is producing gas in the Barents Sea (the Snøhvit field) and the Norwegian Sea. 
Polarled, a new pipeline was opened in 2016, crossing the Arctic Circle and transporting gas from e.g. 
the Aasta Hansteen field to Nyhamna/Molde on the west coast of southern Norway. The reference 
scenario lifts the supply path of Arctic Norway somewhat from the mid-2020s. Total supply increases 
almost fourfold over the whole 2012-2050 period.  
 
In Greenland gas resources have been detected by seismic surveys, but no findings have proven viable 
so far. Several petroleum companies have stopped their exploration activities the last couple of years. 
With relatively high costs and long lead time Greenland is unable to start production before the end of 
the 2030s, but from then on it will gradually produce from present undiscovered fields and output rises 
to 38 Mtoe and reaches almost 5 per cent of arctic supply in 2050. 
3.2 Phasing out coal and phasing in renewables scenario 
For our phase out of coal scenario we align the pathways of fossil versus non-fossil based electricity 
with the 2 degree scenario of IEA (2014a). Our approach is as follows: The share of non-fossil 
feedstock (renewables and nuclear combined) for power production is set exogenously and equal to 
their joint share of 69 per cent as in the 2 degree scenario towards 2040 (IEA, 2014a) as shown in 
Table 2. This share, which is 51 per cent renewables and 18 per cent nuclear, is kept constant towards 
2050 as global power production continues to increase. The remaining share of electricity supply is a 
mix of coal and natural gas (with a tiny share of oil). A CO2-tax is imposed on fossil feedstocks and 
due to differing carbon content this constrains the coal use to the advantage of the use of natural gas as 
this is the least carbon intensive fossil fuel. The CO2 tax level is chosen so that the development of the 
shares of gas and coal in regional electricity generation follows relatively closely to the 2 degree 
scenario, reaching a global share of 17 and 14 per cent for gas and coal, respectively, at the end of the 
18 
projection period.9 Both coal and gas lose much of their growth momentum in power generation 
around 2030, when renewables really start to manifest themselves. In this way we mimic the relative 
strength between gas, coal and non-fossil power in the 2 degree scenario, however, when adapting this 
in the FRISBEE model of the petroleum market we end up with a somewhat higher total consumption 
of electricity worldwide.10 
 
Table 2.  Volume of world electricity production by source. Reference Scenario and Phasing 
Out Coal Scenario. Per cent 
 2015 2050 
Reference    Phasing Out Coal 
Natural gas  (per cent of total) 23 26 17 
Coal  (per cent of total) 38 28 14 
Oil (per cent of total) 4 1   1 
Renewables/nuclear (per cent of total) 35 45 69 
 
In 2050 coal has its share reduced from 28 per cent in the reference scenario to 14 per cent in phasing 
out coal scenario. The strong trend towards non-fossil electricity generation, above all after 2030, also 
reduces the market share of natural gas substantially from 26 to 17 per cent. Hence, if a CO2 tax is 
used to regulate the mix of coal and gas, natural gas is less constrained than coal, but still hurt by the 
policy. 
 
Figures 4, 5a and 5b show that the market shares of arctic gas will be reduced. Around 2030 the 
supply is departing from the reference path – still increasing but at a markedly lower rate. By 2050  
total supply is 600 Mtoe compared with almost 850 Mtoe in the reference scenario. However, the 
Arctic will still deliver an increasing volume of gas as feedstock for electricity production as deliveries 
increase 36 per cent or 160 Mtoe from the 2020s towards 2050. 
 
Russia reduces supply in 2050 by the largest amounts (ca. 130 Mtoe), but Greenland and Alaska loose 
the most in relative terms, both seeing a boom in production foregone (Figure 5a and 5b). The Alaskan 
gas production in 2040 is around 29 Mtoe, close to the projected reference level in EIA (2016). Our 
increase in gas production in Alaska beyond 2040 goes along with a further increase in US gas prices. 
 
  
                                                     
9 As the share of renewables is exogenous it is possible to reach the goals for both coal and gas with one policy instrument, 
the CO2-tax. The regional CO2-prices vary from 105 USD to 125 USD per ton in 2035 and between 145 USD and 165 USD 
in 2050 (2012-prices). 
10 In IEA (2014a) electricity production is 13 per cent lower in the 2 degrees scenario than what follows from NPS in 2040. 
However, IEA include various policy measures beyond carbon pricing. 
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Figure 4. Arctic gas production. Reference and Phasing Out Coal Scenario. Mtoe 
 
 
Figure 5a.    Alaskan gas production. Reference and Phasing Out Coal Scenario. Mtoe 
 
 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 2027 2030 2033 2036 2039 2042 2045 2048
Mtoe
Total Arctic - Reference
Scenario
Total Arctic - Phasing Out Coal
Scenario
Arctic Russia - Reference
Scenario
Arctic Russia - Phasing Out Coal
Scenario
West Arctic Regions - Phasing
Out Coal Scenario
West Arctic Regions -
Reference Scenario
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2036 2040 2044 2048
Mtoe
Alaska - Reference Scenario
Alaska - Phasing Out Coal
Scenario
20 
Figure 5b.    Other West Arctic gas production. Reference and Phasing Out Coal Scenario. Mtoe 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results in terms of the decline in accumulated natural gas production over the period 
2015-2050. For the Arctic as a whole the decline is 9 per cent, for Greenland and Alaska as much as 
69 and 31 per cent, respectively. Their golden age was supposed to be after 2030 in the reference case, 
however, this vision is under pressure in our policy scenario, as renewables really start to crowd out 
gas (and coal) after 2030. The reason for the large decline in supply from Greenland is also due to its 
relatively high capital and operational costs compared to what is the case in the other arctic regions. 
Although Russia no longer sees as rapid growth from around 2035 as in the reference scenario, the 
effect on accumulated production in Arctic Russia of phasing out coal is as low as 6 per cent. After 
Arctic Russia, Norway has the second lowest effect by a reduction of 13 per cent. The reason is that 
Arctic Russia and to some extent Arctic Norway have a relatively smaller share of their accumulated 
production after 2030 in the reference scenario compared to the other regions. The reason for the small 
decline in output from Arctic Russia is also due to its relatively low costs. 
 
Table 3.  Accumulated gas production 2015-2050. Phasing Out Coal Scenario. Deviation from 
Reference Scenario. Per cent    
Total Arctic Greenland Arctic 
Russia 
Arctic 
Canada 
Alaska Arctic 
Norway 
-9 -69 -6 -21 -31 -13 
 
We see from Figure 6 that the Middle Eastern/North-African (MENA) region achieves a market share 
of around 50 per cent towards 2050. There are abundant and cheap gas resources in the MENA region, 
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above all in Iran and Qatar. Table 4 shows the arctic share of total gas production outside the MENA 
region as well as the arctic share of global supply.11 In the reference scenario the share of the Arctic in 
world supply of gas is reduced from 17 per cent in 2015 to 14 per cent by 2050, while it declines to 12 
per cent in the policy scenario.12 In the reference scenario the Arctic increases its share in production 
outside MENA from 27 per cent in 2015 to 35 per cent in 2050. The share in 2050 turns out somewhat 
lower at 33 per cent in the policy scenario, still above today̕ ̕s share. The reason is that arctic 
production is on an increasing trend towards the end of the production period, while in Non-MENA 
production levels off because costs increase as their reserves are being depleted.  
 
Figure 6 Arctic gas production in relation to MENA and global gas supply. Reference Scenario 
and Phasing Out Coal Scenario. Mtoe 
  
Table 4. Arctic gas in relation to MENA and global production. Reference Scenario and Phas-
ing Out Coal Scenario. Per cent 
 2015 2050 
   Reference     Phasing Out Coal 
Arctic share of total production outside 
Middle East/North-Africa 27 35 33 
Arctic share of world gas production 17 14 12 
 
 
                                                     
11 Global gas production in 2040 is almost 4 per cent higher than the NPS in IEA (2014a). 
12 The reason that the reduction in global gas production is over the double of the reduction in gas fired power supply is 
efficiency of generation. Less than 50 per cent of the energy ends up as electricity on the other end of the generator. In 
addition, there is some substitution from gas to electricity in the household and industry sectors. 
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3.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
In a situation with increased power supply compared to the level we so far have assumed, demand for 
natural gas from the Arctic and other regions will increase if we do not impose any further restrictions. 
To simulate such a situation we let global demand for power increase by 10 per cent above the 
reference scenario level in 2050, which is comparable to the level in the Current Policy Scenario of 
IEA (2014a) in 2040, the scenario with the highest level of power demand. This simulation shows that 
phasing out coal and phasing in renewables now will lead to a somewhat smaller reduction in total 
arctic gas production compared to the original global power demand, that is a reduction of 227 Mtoe 
instead of 250 Mtoe in 2050. However, to prevent the level of arctic gas production from declining in 
2050 from the reference scenario, global power demand has to be 50 per cent higher at the end of our 
projection period, which does not seem very plausible. 
 
Another issue involving uncertainty is to what extent all of the gas resources will be accessible, with 
production only limited from a commercial point of view. In our scenarios so far it is assumed that the 
gas companies have full access to resources with no environmental or other political barriers. Access 
to all resources and the subsequent increase in extraction in e.g. Alaska and Canada might meet 
constraints in the building of new gas pipelines or LNG plants, which have been postponed several 
times. In Alaska a large share of land is federal, of which large areas already are national parks and 
precious wilderness. In Canada indigenous peoples’ rights have a strong position and use of these 
rights have postponed or blocked infrastructure projects required for petroleum extraction. In Norway 
production from resources in Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja are subject to strong political opposition 
as the area is the core spawning ground of the valuable North Atlantic cod stock, with fish farming 
along the coast and with natural landscapes experiencing increased interest as a target for tourism. 
Environmental concerns may play a larger role in the future, preventing access to all gas resources. 
Further, some resources are hard to get at, like in Greenland where gas has been detected by seismic 
surveys, but, several petroleum companies have stopped their exploration activities the last couple of 
years, because no findings have proven viable so far. Further, without technological transfers from 
more experienced foreign partners, e.g. in deep sea operations, Russian gas industry might be 
prevented from getting access to all offshore resources. To sum up, we run a scenario to illustrate 
limited access to resources looking at a situation where the arctic gas companies only have access to 
50 per cent of the undiscovered gas resources and trace the effects of phasing out coal in that 
benchmark case. 
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Figure 7, 8a and 8b show the effects of 50 per cent lower arctic undiscovered gas resources on future 
supply. Whereas arctic gas supply embarked upon a marked upwards trend by 2025 in the original 
reference scenario, the case with less available resources delays the upwards trend with another 
decade. We see that gas production in Arctic Russia in the resource adjusted reference scenario is hit 
less towards the end of the projection period compared with the other regions as the vast majority of 
gas production in Russia before 2050 is from proven and already discovered reserves.  
 
Figure 7.    Arctic gas production. Low Resource Scenario and Phase out coal Scenario. Mtoe 
 
 
We also see that gas production of above all Alaska and Greenland is hit relatively more with less 
access to undiscovered resources in the new baseline case, because the bulk of their production 
increase after 2035 stems from resources that are still undiscovered today. Figure 7, Figure 8a and 
Figure 8b also show that phasing out coal and phasing in renewables in this low resource scenario will 
lead to somewhat lower relative reduction in gas deliveries in the various regions, as the baseline 
supply now is below the original reference scenario. Again, Arctic Russia and, hence, total Arctic 
supply is affected to a relatively limited extent in the policy scenario. Once more, those regions with 
increased volumes after 2030 end up with the highest relative losses and total arctic gas production 
turns out only marginally higher in 2050 than in 2012. The 9 per cent lower gas production in Arctic 
Russia in 2050 compared to 2012 is compensated by increased production from all other arctic 
regions. 
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Figure 8a.   Alaskan gas production. Low resource Scenario and Phase out coal Scenario. Mtoe 
 
Figure 8b.   Other West Arctic gas production. Low resource Scenario and Phase out coal Sce-
nario. Mtoe 
 
 
To further check the robustness of our results, we run a scenario with 25 per cent higher operational 
and capital costs in addition to less access to resources. If we phase out coal and phase in renewables 
to comply with the 2 degree scenario in the power sector in this situation, we get further reductions in 
gas supply in all arctic regions. Total Russian supply is around 15 per cent lower towards the end of 
the projection period than today, while the other arctic regions again experience increases in supply 
over the period, albeit to a lesser extent than in the scenario with only less access to reserves. This 
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means that total arctic gas production is not much lower in 2050 than in 2012, even when we phase out 
coal in this bleaker situation for gas producers with higher costs and less resources. In this context we 
emphasize that behind all scenarios many fields are emptied and new ones are discovered and 
developed. Hence, even if phasing out coal leads to lower arctic supply, it will still be profitable to 
develop many new arctic gas fields, even with less promising prospects for arctic activity. Further, we 
will point out that without arctic gas deliveries prices of electricity and non-fossil feedstock could 
experience a large increase. However, to study how the supply of renewables/nuclear reacts to changes 
in demand has to be a part of a future study, where we have endogenized the quantities and prices of 
the non-fossil feedstock.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines to what extent downscaling of global coal based electricity generation 
encourages gas demand and affects regional activity in gas production, with emphasis on the arctic 
regions. The Arctic is above all rich on natural gas as 70 per cent of undiscovered petroleum resources 
in the region are gas.  
 
We apply a recursive, dynamic partial equilibrium model for the global energy markets, which is 
solved sequentially year by year. Our reference scenario is aligned with the New Policy Scenario in 
IEAʼs World Energy Outlook, accounting for that renewables is set to increase its contribution to 
global electricity production over time, while coal will contribute less. Our policy scenario reflects 
further phase out of coal and phase in of renewables in line with the 2 degrees scenario for the power 
sector. 
 
The strong trend towards non-fossil electricity generation in our policy scenario, above all after 2030, 
reduces the market share of natural gas. Natural gas is less constrained than coal, but still hurt by the 
policy. This also entails reduced arctic gas production compared to the reference scenario. For the 
Arctic as a whole the decline in accumulated production is 9 per cent, while for Greenland and Alaska 
it is as much as 69 and 31 per cent, respectively. The reason is that the bulk of their production 
increase in the reference scenario comes after 2030, when renewables really start to crowd out gas 
(and coal). The effect on accumulated production in Arctic Russia of phasing out coal and phasing in 
renewables is as low as 6 per cent. The reason is that Arctic Russia has a relatively larger part of its 
production prior to 2030, when production is not so much crowded out by increased renewables in the 
global power sector.  
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However, Arctic still increases its share in production outside Middle Eastern/North-African (MENA) 
region from 2015 to 2050 in our policy scenario. The reason is that arctic production is on an 
increasing trend towards the end of the production period, while in Non-MENA production levels off 
because costs increase as their reserves are being depleted.  
 
Even in a situation with less resources and higher costs for arctic gas, production in the Arctic is not 
much lower in 2050 than today in the phasing out of coal and phasing in of renewables scenario. 
Hence, even in this bleaker situation for arctic gas producers, it is still profitable to invest in and 
develop new gas reserves.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1. List of gas regions and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
 
Gas13 field category 
1 2 3 4 
Africa Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
Canada Arctic            Non-Arctic Onshore Non-Arctic Offshore shallow  
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep 
Caspian region Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep    
China Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep    
Eastern Europe Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
Greenland All    
Latin America Onshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow      Offshore deep    
Norway Arctic Non-Arctic Onshore Non-Arctic Offshore shallow   
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep    
OECD Pacific Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
OPEC Core Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore              Venezuela          
Rest of Asia Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
OPEC Rest Nigeria  
Onshore             Offshore               Angola                
Russia/Ukraine/
Belarus 
Non-Arctic 
Onshore          
Non-Arctic Offshore             East Arctic Russia  West Arctic Russia 
USA Non-Arctic Onshore 
Alaska               Non-Arctic Offshore 
shallow       
Non-Arctic 
Offshore deep     
Western Europe Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
United Kingdom Onshore < 100 Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore shallow       Offshore deep     
 
                                                     
13 Conventional and unconventional. 
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